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II. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
In further reply to the response arguments made to Davisons' Opening Briefln this appeal, 
and to the Respondent DeBests' characterization of those arguments, Davison Appellants off er 
the following Reply Argument. The Idaho Appellate Rules allow an appellant to submit by way 
of reply, "additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent." See, I.A.R. 
35(c); Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 491, 497 
(2012). 
A. The Facts Underlying This Appeal Support The Conclusion That As A 
Consequence Of Entering Into The Remediation Agreement On July 26, 2013, 
The Respondent DeBest Necessarily Abandoned The Time-Specific NORA 
Procedural Remedies Provided In Subsections (2), (3), (4), & (5) Of I.C. § 6-
2503 
A complete understanding of the factual circumstances that confronted the parties on July 
26, 2013, when an agreement was reached to remediate/restore the Davisons' cabin and to 
resolve their claim, which agreement thereby triggered any remaining applicable statutory 
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provisions of NORA, is key to this Court's rendering a decision in this appeal. Twice on page 26 
of the Respondent's Brief DeBest has declared that: "The undisputed evidence shows that prior 
to this litigation, DeBest was not aware of its pre-lawsuit notice rights under NORA." and "In 
this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that DeBest was not aware of its rights under 
NORA. until after litigation commenced." This same declaration is also made on page 7 of 
Respondent's Brief. Notwithstanding such declarations by DeBest, the controlling principle of 
law was summarized by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 993 P.2d 
1205 (Ct.App.2000) that all persons are presumed to know the law which applies: 
Finally, it is axiomatic that citizens are presumptively charged with 
knowledge of the law once such laws are passed. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 
130, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 2529, 86 L.Ed.2d 81, 93 (1985); North Laramie Land Co. v. 
Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283, 45 S.Ct. 491, 494, 69 L.Ed. 953, 957 (1925). 
Ignorance of the law is not a defense. Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 132 Idaho 881, 
887, 980 P.2d 545, 551 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 
183 (1993). "The entire structure of our democratic government rests on the 
premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the 
particular policies that affect his destiny." Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131, 105 S.Ct. at 
2530, 86 L.Ed.2d at 94. 133 Idaho at 880,993 P.2d at 1211. 
DeBest has persisted throughout its Respondent's Brief with arguments it did not receive 
required pre-litigation notices from Davisons to which it was entitled under NORA, which it is 
certainly entitled to argue since that was the controlling law to which both parties may be bound. 
Nonetheless, it appears DeBest was actually unaware it was entitled to any notices under NORA 
at the time any notices were statutorily required to be submitted to a construction professional, 
whuch act was thought to have been accomplished by the Davisons. 
Ultimately, what is significant concerning the actual facts underlying this appeal, is that 
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the perforn1ance all of NORA's statutorily-required written notices concerning claims, responses, 
rights of inspection, offers of cure, settlement, and the potential for a rejection of any of those 
offers, as to be made within NORA's statutorily-set time frames of 21 days, 14 days, and 30 days 
- were in this case - all compressed and collapsed into a single day- July 26, 2013. All of those 
time-specific settlement procedures declared in subsections (2), (3), ( 4), & (5) of I.C. § 6-2503 of 
NORA, concerning required pre-litigation notices, offers, and responses, were essentially 
rendered unnecessary and a nullity by the immediate agreement reached between Davisons, 
Gould Custom Buliders Inc. (GCBI) and DeBest, whereby GCBI was to remediate/restore the 
damage that had been caused to the Davisons' cabin by DeBest, and for DeBest to then pay for 
the cost of that remediation/restoration. As was pointed out at pp. 20-21 of Appellant's Opening 
Brief, paragraphs 10-13 of DeBest' s Proposed Third Party Complaint provided its own succinct 
summary of the events that occurred at that time (R., pp. 238-239). 
From that date forward - July 26, 2013, there was no longer any reason under NORA for 
Davisons to provide any further forms of "notice" to DeBest, inasmuch as the matter had been 
resolved by the remediation/restoration agreement. Nor would any purpose be served by further 
notice in terms of affording DeBest an opportunity to further inspect, propose a plan, further 
offer to compromise, or to simply reject the Davisons' further assertion that it was responsible 
for the defect. The matter had been resolved by the July 26, 2013 remediation/restoration 
agreement. All that remained to be done was for GCBI to undertake the remediation/restoration 
of the Davisons' cabin, and for De Best to. tender the required payment to GCBI. 
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This key operative fact - that the parties' remediation/restoration agreement arose in a 
single day, the very same day that the leak was first discovered - brings into sharp focus several 
of the questions raised in Davisons' Opening Brief on appeal, especially the very specific 
question raised sua sponte by the district court below, concerning whether an action to enforce a 
remediation/restoration agreement is even covered by NORA? And the related question, that in 
the absence of a statutory remedy provided by NORA, whether the district court was correct in 
then applying Spencer v. Jameson, 14 7 Idaho 497, 211 P .3d 106 (2009) on the basis that 
equitable remedies are barred when a statute provides a complete legal remedy? If in fact NORA 
provides no remedy to this controversy, then perhaps the only remedy available to Davisons is an 
equitable remedy? Both of these questions are more fully and separately addressed in the reply 
argument on those questions that is presented below. 
Ultimately, the district court dismissed Davison's action against DeBest due to the 
absence of written ncitice purportedly not submitted to DeBest prior to filing a civil action, as 
required by LC. § 6-2503(1). (R., pg. 608). 1 Although in accordance with the actual agreement 
The district court concluded: "It is undisputed that the Davisons never sent a 
NORA-compliant notice to DeBest." (R., pg. 607). The Davisons have argued on this appeal 
that the initial email notifying Gould of the leak was forwarded to DeBest. See, Appellant's 
Brief at pg. 14 (R. pp.· 113-114, 530, ~ 8); DeBest denies receiving any written notice. See, 
Respondent's Brief at pp. 7, 21. Yet, as based upon the remediation agreement, it appears 
equally undisputed that written notice of the remediation claim was provided to DeBest by 
means of written invoices prior to the commencement of the litigation, as recited by the district 
court in its sununary judgment decision. (R., pg. 604). Notice prior to the commencement of an 
action is all that NORA requires in order to avoid dismissal. LC. § 6-2503( 1 ). Disputed issues 
of fact should not be determined on a motion for summary judgment. La Bella Vita, LLC v. 
Shuler, 158 Idaho 799/816, 353 P.3d 420,437 (2015). 
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that had been reached on July 26, 2013, in which DeBest deferred undertaking any repairs itself, 
but instead had agreed to pay for the cost of remediation/restoration, the district court's own 
memorandum decision at pg. 3 (R.,, pg. 604) reflects the actual receipt of a pre-litigation written 
notice by DeBest in terms similar to those upheld as being a sufficient pre-litigation notice by the · 
Court in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008). That notice in 
this matter, as recited by the district court, consisted of the following: 
DeBest was noti1otified of this additional damage until February 2014, when it 
received an invoice from Gould for the cost of both the July 2013 repair and the 
later, more extensive repair begun in December 2013. (Neidigh Aff. filed Aug. 8, 
2016, ,r 9.) 
The record reflects some effort by the parties, after DeBest received the 
invoice, to agree on an amount DeBest would pay for the damage to the 
Davisons' cabin. That effort was not, however, successful. Consequently, on 
July 21, 2015, the Davisons filed this action, alleging claims for breach of 
contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and negligence. 
(Compl. ,r 8) · 
(R. pg. 604). 
Therefore, DeBest raises a completely specious argument under NORA when it states 
that a failure of notice as to Davisons' alleged later claims had deprived it of the opportunity to 
remedy those defects. See, Respondent's Brief at pp. 22-23. The record substantiates that the 
only posture DeBest ever took with respect to the provision of a remedy/restoration was to agree . 
to pay the costs incurred, as undertaken by GCBI, as it had originally agreed on July 26, 2013 .. 
DeBest never intended to undertake any direct cure of any defects as otherwise permitted by 
NORA. As the record reflects it was only wh~n DeBests' insurer, through their adjuster came up 
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with a damage estimate approximately $100,000 lower (R. pp. 115-116, 120-121, 534 if19, 540, 
543, 547-550) than the Davisons' actual costs incurred for the labor and materials actually 
required to complete the remediation and repair of the cabin (R. pp. 115-116, 120-121, 534 if 19, 
540, 543, 547-550), that this dispute then turned to civil litigation. 
Twice in Appellant's Opening Brief Davisons raised arguments arising out of the fact 
that this matter had been settled in a single-day making any further pursuit of notices, 
inspections,_ opportunities to cure, and everything else that is provided under NORA simply 
futile. See, Appellant's Opening Brief at pp.27-28, 32. The underlying principle that applies in 
this situation is that the law does not require the performance of useless and futile acts from 
litigants who are seeking relief from the courts. Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, 
483, 567 P.2d 423, 429 (1977). Once NORA-settlement attempts have failed, then evidence of 
the existence of "notice," is at a minimum nothing more than a pro-forma statutory requirement 
to be satisfied prior to filing a civil action. That statutory requirement was certainly satisfied by 
any number of writtencommunications which passed between the parties in this case, including 
the initial e-mail and then the invoice concerning the sum due on the July 26, 2013 remediation/ 
restoration agreement. Unfortunately, the parties ended up about $100,000 apart in their 
respective determinations/analysis as to what the cost of that agreed remediation/restoration cost 
should actually be, leading to the filing of the action underlying this appeal. 
Paragraph 13 of DeBest's own proposed Third Party Complaint summarizes the essence 
of their remediation agre~ment: 
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13. After about three hours, Gould no longer needed assistance from 
the DeBest employee and dismissed him. Before they parted, Gould agreed with 
the DeBest employee that Gould would complete the water damage remediation, 
and agreed with DeBest that he would complete the water damage repairs. Gould 
agreed to send a bill for its work to DeBest. 
Proposed Third Party Complaint (R., pg. 239). 
DeBest is a plumbing contractor. The persistence of a water leak that remains unabated 
for 40 days had thoroughly soaked and penetrated sheetrock, insulation, wood trim, floors, 
furnishings and other materials within Davisons' cabin and made it obvious clean up and 
restoration would entail more than was, or could have been, seen and accomplished in that first 
three hours of work. DeBest, itself, lacked the required expertise to actually perform any, and 
for sure not all, of the required remediation/restoration work required on Davisons' cabin. 
When the bills for the cost of the remediation/restoration were actually sent to_ DeBest in 
February 2014, DeBest did not protest any aspect of the scope of the work, or that it had 
exceeded what had been agreed upon, nor did it even raise any objection to the effect it was not 
bound by the agreement entered into by its employees-agents, Tom Peterson and Laurie Brede 
on July 26, 2013, but instead DeBest simply turned the "entire claim," as then submitted by the 
incoming invoice(s), over to its insurer carrier, who then contacted and hired a local claims 
adjuster, Intem1ountain Claims ofidaho, for further adjustment. (R. pp. 115, 533-534, ,r,r 15, 18, 
19). This conduct hardly seems consistent with the arguments now raised by DeBest in its 
Respondent's Brief at pp. 22-23. As to these arguments, DeBest's earlier conduct with respect to 
what it actually did, · in response to the receipt of the work invoices should be construed as 
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"waiver by conduct." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 458, 259 P.3d 595, 604 
(2011) ("Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an 
intent to waiver, or from conduct amounting to an estoppel." (Emphasis added)). 
If DeBest had actually objected to the scope of the remediation/repair work that had been 
undertaken by GCBI, or objected on the basis that it had not been given fair notice of the scope 
of that work, or that it had not been afforded an adequate opportunity, to itself, engage in the 
actual remediation/ repairs required at Davisons' residence, then those objections should have · 
been so-stated at the time the invoices were presented. Those objections were not so-stated at 
that time. DeBest is presumed to be a knowledgeable and competent plumbing contractor, well 
of aware of the consequences that will foreseeably arise throughout a residence as the result of a 
water leak that has occurred in an upstairs bathroom when that leak persists unabated for a period ·. 
40 days and soaked the residence throughout! 
In this matter, because the settlement by means of the remediation/restoration agreement 
was reached on the same day that the plumbing water leak itself was discovered on July 26, 
2013, DeBest essentially abandoned any further need or right to receive any further or other 
notice of that defect from Davisons under LC. § 6-2503(1), along with the concomitant right to 
thereafter inspect, submit a plan to remedy, or to further offer to compromise and settle the 
damages, or to actually remedy the defect themselves, all of which are encompassed within 
subsections (2), (3), (4)& (5) ofl.C. § 6-2503. And in a Corresponding manner, any attempt to 
further perform under those same subsections by .Davi~ons was also rendered futile by the 
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remediation/restoration agreement that Davisons, DeBest and GCBI entered into on July 26, 
2013 to cure the consequences of this plumbing water leak which occurred at Davisons' cabin as 
a "construction defect"< caused defective work performed by DeBest for which it never denied 
having caused, but affirmatively admitted was their responsibility and liability to repair/restore. 
In the face of DeBest's repeated declarations that it was completely unaware of NORA's 
notice requirements prior to filing the litigation underlying this appeal (Respondent's Brief, pp. 
7, 26), DeBest's arguments, as now made that it was deprivecl of adequate notice and an 
opportunity to repair, are nothing but a fable/fairytale in the face of its actual actions in 
immediately entering into the remediation/restoration agreement with Davisons/GCBI on July 
26, 2013. To the extent that NORA does require a further proforma written notice prior to the 
filing of an action, sufficient written notice related to the ultimate failure in the payment required 
under the remediation/restoration settlement, has been provided by the written invoices 
submitted to DeBest, such that summary judgment should not have been entered on that basis. 
B. An Issue Is Preserved For Review On A Subsequent Appeal, If That Issue Was 
Raised Below, Or Was Subject To An Adverse Ruling By The Court Below 
This case was dismissed on procedural grounds at summary judgment due to a privity bar 
to Davisons' contract claims, and due to the perceived lack ofrequired pre-litigation notice under 
NORJ\ as to their remaining negligence claims. (R., pp. 602-614). The district court nonetheless 
went to some effort to signal its position, that even if this case had continued, that court was of 
the opinion that NORJ\: would not have applied to a claim alleging a breach of the remediation 
agreement. (R., pp. ·.610-11), an issue which Davisons raised in their Opening Brief in this 
.... 
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appeal. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 21-23. 
DeBest has argued in Response that Davisons have impermissibly raised this issue for the 
first time on appeal that this Court is barred from considering it on that basis, and because 
Davisons have not cited authority in support of their argument. See, Respondent's Brief at pp. 
10-14. Davisons began the argument in their Opening Brief on this question with a citation to 
Kolar v. Cassia County; Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005) for the proposition 
thatin order to preserve an issue for appeal, it either must have been raised in the court below, or 
been subject to an adverse ruling by the court below. This is a common principle of appellate 
review recently stated in Skinner v. US. Home Bank Mortgage, 159 Idaho 642, 650, 365 P.3d 
398,406 (2016); and Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enters., LLC, 154 Idaho 824,828,303 P.3d 
183, 187 (2013). 
While it may be debatable whether the district court's summary judgement decision 
constitutes an "adverse ruling," it nonetheless is reviewable in this appeal within the scope of 
I.A.R. 17( e )(1 ), this question is also raised within the common rule of practice that district judges 
are presumed to know the law, Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 117, 233 
P.3d 38, 48 (2009). Therefore, it simply seems to be a matter of logic and reason that Judge 
Scott was not just engaging in an idle exercise by sua sponte raising and addressing this very 
specific question that goes to the very heart of the parties' then-pending dispute when having 
issued his summary judgment decision. 
Perhaps the district court may be correct in its determinatiO!]. that the NORA statutes do 
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not have any application to remediation/restoration agreements such as that which was entered 
into between Davisons, DeBest and GCBI on July 26, 2013! 
Recall from the underlying facts that Davisons have actually paid to GCBI the full 
amount of the cost of the remediation/restoration at issue - $123,345.64 - so as to avoid 
complications related to the state lease where their cabin is located. (R., pg. 121 ). See, · 
Appellant's Opening Brief at pg. 16. As defined in NORA, Davisons' "action," while based in 
both contracfand negligence, as defined in LC. § 6-2502(1) has essentially been a lawsuit in 
indemnit}1 against DeBest as the construction professional who caused the defect during the 
remodel of their cabin.·· 
The "action" which may be commenced, as described throughout NORA's statutory 
provisions is referenced by, "the claim described in the notice of claim." See e.g., LC. § 6-
2503(3)(a) & (b); 6-2503(4)(c) & (d). Section 6-2503(2)(b) references an "Offer to compromise 
and settle the claim by monetary payment without inspection;" and section 6-2503(4)(b)(ii) 
references, "A written offer to compromise and settle the claim by monetary payment pursuant to 
2(b) of this section; .... " Subsection (7) of§ 6-2503 then identifies three contingencies in 
which an action can be commenced if the described settlement procedures fail: 
(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a claimant from 
commencing an action on the construction defect claim described in the notice of 
claim if the construction professional fails to perform the construction agreed 
upon, fails to remedy the defect or fails to perform by the timetable agreed upon 
pursuant to subsection ( 4 )(b) or (5)(b) of this section. (Emphasis added). 
So while NORA does contain reference_s to settlement by monetary payment, it is silent 
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as to any fom1 of enforcement in the circumstances presented by this matter, whereby the parties 
entered into a remediation/restoration agreement, in which one party agrees to perform the 
needed work, and the construction professional responsible for the construction defect (DeBest) 
agrees to pay for the entire cost of the labor and materials. What happens when the cost of the 
remediation/restoration is placed in subsequent controversy as to the incurred costs at dispute? 
Somewhat ironically, both Davison Appellants and Respondent DeBest appear to be in 
agreement on the fundamental underlying question presented here, which is that NORA should 
apply to the resolution of the facts of this appeal as arising out of the parties' agreement in which . 
GCBI undertook the remediation/restoration on behalf of DeBest, with Debest agreeing to pay 
for the costs. In many situations when a construction defect leads to collateral damage requiring 
repairs unrelated to the field of expertise for which the construction professional causing that 
defect is neither licensed or competent to remedy, the decision to hire competent professionals or 
tradesmen id the only:logical approach to provide an adequate remedy. Here, the district court 
has expressed its intention to follow a much narrower interpretation of NORA, which would 
limit the application ·. of that Act to only those circumstances in which the construction 
professional actually undertakes the repairs required to repair the construction defect. As a 
consequence, on any remand it would be reasonable to expect that the district court is likely to 
reach a determination in this case that NORA simply does not apply to the parties' 
remediation/restoration agreement relating to Davisons' cabin at all. 
If this is in fact th~ outcome on any remand of this appeal to the district court, then 
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almost certainly another appeal will inevitably arise on this very same question: Does NORA 
apply to remediation/repair agreements entered into by the parties under which the construction 
professional responsible for the construction defect simply agrees to pay someone else to 
remedy/restore that defect? Therefore, the decision of this issue in this appeal, rather than 
waiting for a subsequent appeal, would be consistent with principles of judicial economy and 
reason. Jvfatter of Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452,457, 716 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1986); and LC.§ 
1-205. 
C. If NORA Expressly Permits A Claimant Homeowner To Commence A Contract 
Action For Damages Or Indemnity Against The Construction Professional Who Has 
Caused A Construction Defect, Then The Common Law "Privity Defense" That 
Would Otherwise Bar That Action Must Be Deemed To Be Statutorily Waived By 
NORA 
In response to Davison's argument that enactment of NORA has waived any privity 
requirement that might otherwise exist for contract claims asserted after the conditions precedent 
of that Act have been satisfied, DeBest has argued that "privity" is a required element of a breach 
of contract claim, and is not an affirmative defense. See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 18.2 In all 
circumstances, what constitutes a Rule 8(c) affirmative defense is necessarily dependent upon 
the claim that is being asserted and pursued. Even if NORA did not exist, and the Davisons had 
commenced a civil action in which they had stated a contract claim against DeBest as the 
intended third-party beneficiary of the contract/agreement between GCBI and DeBest, it would 
2 DeBest raised the absence of privity of contract as its fourth "affirmative defense" 
in resQonse to the Davison's Complaint in the action underlying this Appeal. S~e, Answer and 
Demand For Jury Tri~l - 4 (R., pg. 24). · 
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be surprising if DeBest would not raise the defense of a "lack of privity" as an affirmative 
defense to that third-party beneficiary claim that would be asserted against DeBest. 
The contract claim at issue in this appeal is Davison's right to proceed against DeBest 
after satisfying the statutorily-required conditions precedent of NORA as to their construction 
professional with whom they had contracted. The statutorily defined terms of: "Claimant," 
"Construction Professional," and "Action," are respectively defined in NORA at LC. § 6-2502 
subsections (3), ( 4), & (I} The conditions "precedent" to commencing this action are outlined in 
LC. § 6-2503(1), but the critical language is: 
Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a 
construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the 
construction professional. . . . Any action commenced by a claimant prior to 
compliance with the requirements of this section shall be dismissed by the court 
without prejudice and may not be recommenced until the claimant has complied 
with the requirements of this section ..... 
Therefore, Davisons, as the statutory "claimant", in bringing an action against DeBest, as 
among a statutorily defined "construction professional, for damages caused by a water leak that 
persisted unabated for a period of 40-days, a construction defect that DeBest admittedly caused 
and accepted liability, and despite their admitted responsibility, has postured "privity" in this 
matter as their affirmative defense, claiming DeBest did not have a contractual relationship with 
Davisons, thereby asserting that defense within the context of the NORA statutory framework. 
Rule 8( c) affirmative defenses are broadly defined under Idaho law. In Fuhriman v. 
State, Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 803, 153 P.3d 480, 483 (2007), the Court declared that, 
"An affimrntive defense is '[a] defendant's assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if 
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true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are . 
true.' Blacks Law Dictionary 186 (2d Pocket ed.2001 )." Also cited in Bolognese v. Forte, 153 . 
Idaho 857, 862, 292 P.3d 248, 253 (2012). Certainly in the context of this matter, privity has 
been determined by the district court to be a bar to Davisons' contract claims. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 
196 P.3d 352 (2008), the Idaho Building Contractors Association sponsored the enactment of 
NORA for the purpose of curbing litigation against building contractors by homeowners. "The . 
purpose of the law is to give contractors the opportunity to fix construction defects before a 
lawsuit is filed." 146 Idaho at 436, 196 P.3d at 354. The essential feature of the Act is the 
provision of a series of several options by which a "construction professional" can inspect, offer 
to compromise and settle, remedy the defect, or refuse to remedy the alleged defect. Upon the 
failure of the construction professional to satisfactorily address these options the "claimant" is 
then allowed to pursue a civil action against the construction professional to obtain a remedy in 
damages. 
Both LC. § 6-2503(1 ), and the definition of "action" provided in I.C. § 6-2502(1) are . 
quite specific as to the identity of the party against whom an action can ultimately brought if 
NORA's statutorily-mandated settlement process does not resolve the dispute: 
6-2502. Definitions. -
( 1) "Action" means any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for 
damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a 
claim ... caused by a defect .... 
6-2503. Notice and opportunfty to repair. -
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(1) Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional 
for a construction defect, . . . . (Emphasis added). 
The construction professional who has caused the defect (in this case DeBest), in order to 
avoid litigation, has a right to trigger the NORA settlement procedures. If those statutory 
settlement procedures fail to produce a mutually-agreed upon settlement, which had cured the 
defect through one of the stated means, then the homeowner, as stated in the above-cited statutes, 
is given a right to bring an action against that construction professional who caused the defect. 
Inherent in that statutorily-created procedure is the compulsion to force the homeowner to 
engage in settlement before litigation, and the corresponding right of the homeowner to then 
proceed to litigation if settlement fails. Except in this instance, the district court held that the 
construction professional cannot be compelled by the homeowner to be subject to litigation 
because the common law privily defense is not waived as an inherent part of the legislature's 
enactment of NORA. 
The Davisons' argument was based upon the above-cited statutory language, and also 
upon the language intended effects of LC. § 6-2504(6), which declares: 
(6) All applicable affirmative defenses are preserved for causes of action 
to which this chapter does not apply. (Emphasis added). 
If NORA's statutorily-created quid-pro-quo is to be effective, then inherent in that. 
statutory procedure there must be a waiver of the privity defense to contract claims brought 
against the enumerated construction professionals. Otherwise, there is no incentive for a 
construction professional to enter into honest and meaningful settlement negotiations with 
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harmed homeowners, such as Davisons, when the statutory language that the homeowner 
claimant is entitled to bring an action against that construction professional will not be given 
effect in respect to a contract related claim. 
The NORA statute declares a claimant-homeowner (Davisons) have the right to proceed 
against a construction professional (DeBest) who caused the construction defeci, to recover 
damages or indemnity. The district court in this matter said the absence of privity of contract · 
bars Davisons from proceeding on that basis against DeBest. In order to make NORA statutory · 
procedures work equitably, the statute must be construed to have intended inclusion of a waiver 
of the common law privity, so that the statutory right to bring an action against the construction 
professional who caused the construction defect can be meaningfully pursued. Therefore, the 
district court's summary judgment decision should be reversed. 
D. The District Court's Own Construction Of NORA Has Undercut Its Reliance Upon 
The Decision In Spencer v. Jameson As Barring Equitable Remedies 
In reliance upon Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 211 P.3d 106 (2009) the District 
Court rejected Davisons' resort to equity involving questions of waiver, estoppel, and promissory 
estoppel, on the basis that NORA provided adequate legal remedies, and that equity cannot be 
invoked when a statute provides adequate legal remedies. Davisons argued in their Opening 
Brief in this appeal (pp. 27-29), that not only did the district court's application of NORA deny 
Davison's any meaningful remedy, but that the district court's clear indication of its inclination 
that NORA probably did not apply to the facts of this dispute at all, could end up denying the 
Davisons any remedy under the statute. The Davisons would be left to conclude that in these 
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circumstances, NORAwas so artfully employed by the construction professional that it had not 
just afforded a means to avoid civil litigation, but apparently also provided a means by which to 
create immunity from any civil liability whatsoever. 
DeBest in its Respondent's Brief (pp. 22-28), now faults Davisons for not adequately 
distinguishing the Spencer Court's rejection of an equitable remedy in deference to the full and 
adequate legal remedies provided by the Trust Deed Act in that case, as compared to the non-
existent remedies provided to the Davisons by NORA in this case. Briefly, in Spencer; the Court· 
was confronted with how to dispose of funds that had been bid excess of the amount due on the . 
underlying notes in a non-judicial foreclosure. I.C. § 45-1507 provided express direction to the . 
Trustee concerning how to apply those excess funds. The Respondents made an alternative 
argument for the application of those excess funds in satisfaction of liens under several 
subordination· agreements. The Court rejected those arguments, stating that the Trustee was 
bound by the statutory directive as to apply the excess funds. The statute in that case applied and 
controlled, as opposedto an alternative appeal to equity in contravention to the express statutory 
directive. 
In contrast, inthe matter before this Court in this appeal concerning the NORA remedies, 
and by reference to the arguments made in both Appellant's Opening Brief and again on this 
Reply Brief, the district court clearly expressed its inclination to simply reject the NORA 
directives as applied to the facts of this case, involving a remediation/restoration agreement. In 
other words, the district court indicated it would be_ unwilling to provide any statutory remedy 
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under NORA as applied to the parties' remediation/restoration agreement, which is at issue in 
this appeal. In addition, even if that hurdle is surmounted, if this Court on appeal interprets 
NORA for the first time as not waiving any privity requirement as to subcontractors who have 
not settled homeowner claims, then again, there will be no statutory remedy available for 
Davisons. So, both ofthese scenarios are in contrast to the situation that was before the Court in 
Spencer, in which there was a straight-forward and applicable statutory remedy under the Idaho 
· ·.•·Trust Deed Ac~ inlieu-of the argued-for alternative equitable remedy. ·. · · 
In summary, because a remediation/restoration agreement was entered into on the day the 
construction defect was discovered (July 26, 2013), all attempts at any further notice and cure 
after that date are rationally rendered impossible, unnecessary or futile to pursue. The settlement 
was accomplished. Nonetheless, though Davisons adhered to their part of the agreement, 
eliminating the huge costs of alternate housing accommodations, and allowed major restoration 
to be commenced that fall, failure to undertake further conditions precedent (notice), or 
otherwise, as it now stands, Davisons are rendered without a NORA remedy. If further notice to 
DeBest (beyond the forwarded e-mail from GCBI to DeBest) is deemed to be a ''pro forma" 
requirement, would not the presentation of the invoices to DeBest for the labor and materials 
expended in the remediation/repair process be sufficient compliance? Those invoices were 
· submitted prior to the filing of the civil action, and no objection raised by DeBest, as that was 
their arrangement. If the requirement of further notice is to be deemed unnecessary and futile by 
this court, then as it stands from the lower court, common law privity bars Davisons from 
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recovery/indemnity for their damages relating to any contract-based action that Davisons 
otherwise have attempted, notwithstanding NORA's express language a claimant may 
commence an action against a construction professional who caused the defect. Finally, because 
NORA provisions do not expressly incorporate "remediation/restoration agreements," the 
possibility remains NORA may be held to be inapplicable to the enforcement of that very 
agreement Unlike the straight-forward list of priorities for the application of excess fund 
payments under the Trust Deed Act in Spencer, in this matter Davisons may not have any 
meaningful remedy whatsoever under NORA. In these circumstances they should not be held to 
be without a meaningful remedy, but the actual facts should be honestly addressed, and if 
necessary equitable remedies in the nature of waiver by conduct amounting to estoppel should be 
employed. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,458,259 P.3d 595,604 (2011). 
E. The District Court Erred In Awarding Attorney's Fees To DeBest Below 
In response to Davisons' argument the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees 
below under LC.§ 12-121, DeBest has misapprehended the argument that has been made by the · 
Davisons in opposition.to the award of those fees. The district court awarded DeBest § 12-121 
on the Davisons' contract claims. In arguing for reversal of that award in their Opening Brief, 
Davisons had pointed out that the district court had really entered into a kind of a straddle in its 
logic, both reasoning that the remediation/repair agreement which was entered into on July 26, 
2013 was not subject to NORA, but that even if that agreement was subject to NORA, the 
Davisons s~mply had no right to commence any civil action against DeBest, as a cc;mstruction 
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professional, due to the bar implicated by the lack of privity. 
It remains important to remember this entire case ended at the summary judgment stage . 
below, ultimately on the alleged failure of the Davisons to comply with the NORA "notice 
requirements. The case did not continue long enough for the underlying theories to reach greater 
development, but as to the remediation/repair agreement between DeBest and GCBI, it was made 
for the direct benefit of the Davisons. It was their summer cabin that was damaged as the result 
of the water leak caused by DeBest. The remediation/repair undertaken by GBCI was for the 
purpose of repairing that damage, and was to be paid for by DeBest. Certainly, that the Davisons 
would have had standing, as third party beneficiaries, to enforce that remediation/repair 
agreement could hardly be disputed. Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley & 
Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679,691, 365 P.3d 1033, 1045 (2016). A contract made expressly for the 
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it. 
LC. § 29-102; Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 42, 156 P.3d 539, 543 (2007). So even if 
NORA did not apply, as advanced by the district court, the Davisons' standing to proceed would 
not have been impaired as to their alleged contract claims, certainly not to the extent of being .. 
deemed completely frivolous. 
NORA itself contemplates a quid pro quo type of statutory mandated settlement process. 
Both LC. § 6-2503(1) and the definition of "action" in LC. § 6-2502(1) are quite specific as to 
the identity of the party against whom an action can ultimately brought if that statutorily-
mandated settlement process does not resolve the dispute: 
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6-2502. Definitions. -
(1) "Action" means any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for 
damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a 
claim ... caused by a defect .... (Emphasis added) 
6-2503. Notice and opportunity to repair. -
(1) Prior to commencing an action against a construction professional 
for a construction defect, . . . . (Emphasis added). 
The construction professional who has caused the defect (DeBest), in order to avoid 
litigation, has a right t() trigger the NORA settlement procedures. If those statutory settlement 
procedures fail to produce a mutually-agreed settlement which cures the defect through one of 
the stated means, then the homeowner claimant, as stated in the above-cited statutes, is given a 
right to bring an actioi::i against that construction professional who caused the defect. Inherent in 
that statutorily-created procedure is the compulsion to force the homeowner to engage in 
settlement before litigation, and the corresponding right of the homeowner to then proceed to 
litigation if settlement fails. Except in this instance, the district court held that the construction 
professional can't be compelled by the homeowner to be subject to litigation because of the lack 
of privity defense. 
The Davisons' argument was merely that if this statutorily-created quid-pro-quo was to 
be effective, then inherent in that statutory procedure was a waiver of the privity defense to 
contract claims brought against the enumerated contract professionals. By way of analogy, the 
Davisons cited in their Opening Brief the fact that until the Court's decision in Brian and 
Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 _Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010) there had been a 
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general misapplication of the economic loss rule in negligence cases, even by highly regarded 
district judges. Hence Davisons' argument in this appeal, on a question of statutory interpretation 
concerning the application of NORA, which has never before been decided. The Davisons still 
invoke those long-standing standards as stated in Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 
905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1984) and Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 
P.2d 1231, 1235 (Ct.App.1986) the standard for determining whether such an award should be 
made is not whether the position urged by the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be 
wrong, but whether it is so plainly fallacious as to be frivolous. Davisons' argument, as based 
upon the right set out on the face of NORA to bring a claim directly against the construction 
professional who caused the defect, even if that claim is based upon contract, was, and is not, so 
fallacious as to be deemed frivolous. 
F. DeBest's Arguments In Opposing The Davison's Request For An Award Of 
Attorney's Fees On Appeal Are Without Merit 
The only argument made by DeBest in opposition to Davisons' request for an award of 
attorney's fees under LC. § 6-2504(1)(d), should the Davisons prevail on this appeal, is that 
Davisons' request should be denied on the basis that they "failed to meet the notice requirements 
of Idaho Code § 6-2503 prior to commencing their lawsuit for the reasons explained above." 
See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 33. As already argued above, DeBest has realistically abandoned 
any further notice requirements when it entered into the remediation/repair agreement on July 26, 
2013, essentially rendering any further attempt at performance of any further procedural 
prerequisites under NORA to be entirely futile. As to the remediation/repair agreement itself, . 
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inasmuch as actual wrjtten notice of the performance of the agreed remediation/restoration was a 
condition precedent of the commencement of any civil action, then certainly notice consistent 
with that deemed sufficient in Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 
(2008) occurred when DeBest, at the very least, received direct written invoices representing the 
performance of that remediation/repair arrangement prior the commencement of the underlying 
civil action. Certainly, if Davisons prevail in this appeal, they should be entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees as provided by LC. § 6-2504(l)(d). 
DeBest's arguments in opposition to Davisons' request for an award of attorneys' fees 
under LC. § 12-120(3) misapprehends the basis upon which that statute has been invoked by the . 
Davisons on this appeal. That statute has been interpreted to have three separate "prongs" upon . 
which recovery may be obtained. There are six separately listed instruments or claims 
constituting the first prong ([I] open account, [2] account stated, [3] note, [4] bill, [5] negotiable 
instrument, and [5] guaranty). The second is the contract prong ("contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services"). Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 
152 Idaho 305, 271 F;3d 703 (2012) ("Noak thus sought to recover against IDOC based on a 
contract relating to services. . . . Noak misunderstands the essence of his claim, which he 
characterizes as something other than a contract claim, but that does not change the fact that 
Noak alleged a cause of action based upon a contract (even though he was not a party to that 
contract). Accordingly, IDOC, as the prevailing party, may recover fees."). The third is the 
commercial transacticm prong ("and in any commercial transaction unless oth~rwise provided by 
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law"). Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 470, 259 P.3d 608, 616 (2011); and Eriksen v. Blue 
Cross of Idaho Health Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct.App.1989) ("'services' 
and the other enumerated elements of LC. § 12-120(3) are not limited by the words 'commercial 
transaction."'). 
The Davisons fequested an award based upon the second prong of I.C. § 12-130(3) - ~ 
contract for services .. DeBest has only argued against an award being made under I.C. § 12-
120(3) on the basis of·the third prong, the commercial transactions prong, and then by the · 
invocation of the household purposes exception to the commercial transactions prong. See, 
Respondent's Brief at pp. 35-36. Under NORA, an "Action" is defined at LC. § 6-2502(1) as a 
lawsuit in. which the claimant proceeds "in contract or tort for damages or indemnity brought 
against a construction professional .... " (Emphasis added). As declared in the Statement of 
Facts in the Davisons' Opening Brief on this Appeal (Appellant's Opening Brief at pg. 16), 
Davisons' have paid the full amount of the remediation/repairs ($123,345, 64) in order to avoid 
potential complications that might otherwise arise if liens were placed against the state leased 
land upon which their summer home cabin is located. Therefore, this action can be characterized 
as one in indemnity. or perhaps alternatively one in which Davisons are intended third party 
beneficiaries of the remediation/restoration agreement made between GBCI and DeBest. In 
either scenario, a contract for services exists which Davisons are entitled to enforce, and under 
which they are entitled to seek an award of attorney's fees if deemed the prevailing party in this 
appeal. Because DeBest has failed to challenge the "contract for services" prong upon which the 
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Davisons requested fees under LC. § 12-120(3), an award should be made to the Davisons under 
that statute if they are the prevailing party on this appeal. 
G. DeBest Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On This Appeal 
DeBest requested an award of attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-121 and 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). The procedural rule upon which an award of attorney's fees can be made upon 
appeal is Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Generally the civil rules have no application on appeals to 
Idaho's appellate. courts. See e.g., Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 112, 233 
P.3d 38, 43 (2009) ('~Although the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in appellate 
proceedings, Rule 40(d), pertaining to disqualification of trial court judges, is instructive." 
(Emphasis added)). The Court in Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 241 P.3d 972 (2010) 
addressed this exact question more thoroughly: 
In the· argument portion of their brief, Bagleys did not address their 
request for an award of attorney fees. For example, they did not explain what 
provision in Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees in this 
case. They did not elucidate how Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, which is 
applicable in the district courts and the magistrate's division of the district courts 
(Idaho R. Civ. P. l(a)), grants the right to attorney fees on appeal. They did not 
explicate how Idaho Code § 12-123, which does not apply on appeal (Bird v. 
Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 353, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009)), applies to this particular 
appeal. They did not enlighten this Court as to how Idaho Appellate Rule 41, 
which does notprovide authority to award attorney fees (Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 
116 Idaho 315,322,775 P.2d 629,636 (1989)), authorizes such an award here. 
Finally, they did not expound upon how this appeal meets the standard for 
awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, nor did they even state what 
that standard is. 
149 Idaho at 805, 24L·P.3d at 978 (emphasis added). See also, Belstler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 
827 n. 4, 264 P.3d 926, 834 n. 4 (2011) ("Both parties cite to Rule 54(e)(l) as part of their 
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arguments for attorney fees on appeal, but neither argues how this rule is applicable to the 
Supreme Court. See I.R.C.P. Rule l(a); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 
978 (2010)."). Inasmuch as DeBest has expressly based its procedural claim to attorney's fees ·. 
on Civil Rule 54, rather than upon Appellate Rule 41, that claim to attorney's fees should be · 
denied. 
This appeal involves a liability claim that is essentially undisputed. The Respondent 
De~est failed to properly install a plumbing fixture fr1 Davison Appellant's summer home, with 
the result that a water. leak ran undiscovered for almost 40 days causing severe and extensive 
damage to that iesidence. DeBest accepted responsibility and entered into a 
remediation/restoration_'agreement on the day the leak was discovered on July 26, 2013. 
The issues raised and presented in this appeal under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair 
Act (NORA), LC. §§ 6-2501 through 2504 are of first impression. Generally an award of 
attorney's fees should not be made under LC. § 12-121 when the question presented involves a 
matter of first impression, Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Parktowne Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 376, 
379, 128 P.3d 913, 916 (2005), or a novel question is raised that has not been previously 
considered by the court, Hoaglandv. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900,916,303 P.3d 587,603 (2013), ·. 
or an area of unsettled area of the law is raised, presented and decided by the court on the facts · 
presented, Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 681, 152 P.3d 544, 552 (2007) ("The previously 
unsettled state of the law on the characterization of professional goodwill makes an award of 
attorney's fees u!lder § 12-121 inappropriate."); this result is dictated even by application o_f that 
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change in the rule which now permits an apportionment of fees under § 12-121 as to those 
"elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation." James v. City 
of Boise, 160 Idaho 466, 488, 376 P.3d 33, 55 (2016). See generally, Wyman v. Eck, 161 Idaho 
723, 727, 390 P.3d 449, 453 (2017) ("Fees will generally not be awarded for arguments that are 
based on a good faith legal argument.' Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 
1214, 1230 (2016)."). 
On this appeal DeBest has freely admitted that it was unaware of the NORA requirements 
until the underlying litigation was initiated, yet in this appeal DeBest has emphatically argued 
that the action below was properly dismissed for lack of notice and the associated opportunity to 
cure the defects. This argument is made in the face of the fact that once the remediation/repair 
agreement was made on July 26, 2013 any further attempt by Davisons to further comply with 
NORA's notice requirements as associated with that opportunity to cure would have been 
entirely futile. DeBest had abandoned those opportunities (apparently claiming they did not 
know they existed) in exchange for making a payment for the remediation/repair to be 
undertaken by GCBI. 
The district court, although declaring it concurred with the parties' arguments NORA 
applied to this dispute, nonetheless, in a sua sponte, fashion, interjected an over-arching question 
into this case concerning whether NORA on its face has any application to a dispute that arises 
over the payment of a remediation/repair settlement agreement that has arisen out of a 
construction defect dispute, the repair of which otherwise to be covereq through NORA. 
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The entire settlement methodology that was to be provided by NORA was to reduce, or 
eliminate litigation, for the benefit of the enumerated construction professionals. The enacted 
statutes provided the claimant homeowners the right to commence civil litigation against those 
same enumerated construction professionals if those statutory settlement procedures failed to 
produce a mutually agreeable and satisfactory outcome that cured the construction defect. 
Inherent in that enactment was both the compulsion to first engage in settlement prior to 
litigation {dismissal of any prematurely filed action), and the right after satisfying those statutory 
conditions precedent of a homeowner claimant to commence litigation upon a failure of the 
settlement procedures. In this case the district court ruled that a bar remains to a homeowner 
claimants' right to commence litigation, even if NORA settlement procedures have otherwise 
been properly triggered- the lack of privity of contract as a bar to the contract claim. 
All that Davisons have argued is that if the enumerated construction professionals 
(including subcontractors and those with lien rights) have been granted the right to compel 
settlement in order to avoid litigation ( even litigation in which those construction professionals 
might only be joined as third-parties), then the corresponding right of the homeowner to bring a 
direct action against those construction professionals should clearly be understood to exist under 
the statute. Otherwise the NORA settlement procedures as to those contract claims becomes a 
meaningless exercise - the construction professional knows that homeowner claimant has no 
recourse to a direct action against that construction professional as NORA otherwise 
contemplates for other claims. 
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None of these issues and questions as to the application of NORA is controlled by 
existing Idaho precedent. The Davisons remain uncompensated for damages for which there is 
virtually no question that DeBest is the responsible party. The questions are how those damages 
are to be procedurally presented and determined either by satisfying the NORA conditions 
precedent, or perhaps free of that statutory constraint, by some other means. To attempt to 
resolve these questions and obtain fair and adequate compensation in these circumstances cannot 
be deemed unreasonable, nor frivolous. Therefore, even ifDeBestshould prevail on this appeal, 
it should be denied its request for attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-121. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court, dismissing Davisons' claims should be reversed. The 
decision of the district c.ourt awarding DeBest attorney's fees should be reversed. The Davisons 
should be awarded their costs and attorney's fees on appeal. This case should be remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully siibmitted this 14th day of August, 201 
ernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Davison Appellants 
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